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| 1940 Battle of France |
Even following the results of World War I Germany remained
the nation with the greatest economic potential of all Western Europe. Given its industrial and intellectual
resources the German nation would have likely achieved its current standing
among nations many decades ago without resorting to war. This obviously was not apparent to the
followers of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, whose ambitions were beyond any
diplomatic solution. Resorting to conventional military tactics to
achieve Germany’s aims was not an option as the nation could not sustain a
prolonged war of attrition. Hitler
employed a strategy of isolating one’s enemies, one at a time, then following
up with a quick, decisive military victory.
This approach required a tactical doctrine that took advantage of the
newest military technologies.
The world witnessed the devastating effect that Blitzkrieg
had on Allied forces in 1940’s Battle of France. Hitler’s armies held the initiative during
the entire course of the battle, despite the fact that French and British forces
were equivalent in strength to their German adversaries. Allied commanders had no counter to Germany’s
lightening warfare that combined a focused armored punch with breakout speed
and mobility.
There are five essential elements to Blitzkrieg tactical
doctrine.
1. Surprise. The idea is to limit one’s own loses by
striking hard with a spearhead of tanks at a soft-point of the enemy. In 1940 this involved the use of
deception. French and British Allied
commanders expected Germany to sweep through the Low Countries of Belgium and
Holland much as they did in 1914 prior to their invasion of northern
France. Germany encouraged this belief
by moving a large army swiftly into the area, much as they had done at the
start of World War I. But this was not
the real offensive. It was only a feint
to draw the Allied forces forward, leaving them vulnerable to the real attack
that was coming through the Ardennes, several miles to their southeast.
2. Air Control. While the ground forces of the opposing
armies were roughly equivalent in strength, the German Luftwaffe retained a
significant advantage over the allied air forces in both quantity and quality
of their aircraft. German fighter
aircraft were quickly able to dominate the skies, enabling German dive-bombers
to coordinate their precision strikes in support of advancing German
tanks. The Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighter
had no equals over the skies of France save for a few, underrepresented,
British Spitfires. This enabled the
Junkers Ju 87 ‘Stuka’ dive-bomber to act as airborne artillery, picking off
enemy strong-points in support of German armor on the ground. Attacks from the air were also instrumental
in disrupting enemy attempts at supplying and reinforcing frontline
troops. Communications facilities were
attacked, sowing further confusion.
3. Breakthrough. Blitzkrieg doctrine concentrated overwhelming
force onto a narrow front of the enemy’s line in order to quickly breach the
opposition’s defense and then rapidly pour its forces into the weakly defended
backfield. While the allied armies of
the west generally distributed their tanks as support for their infantry,
German tactics called for specialized panzer divisions. In 1940 these divisions each had about 240
tanks along with assorted other support vehicles. There were seven such panzer divisions that
broke out of the Ardennes forest in May of that year. They were quickly followed up by three
mechanized infantry divisions whose role was to provide flank defense for the
initial breach. This armored surge was
aided in its mission by Stuka aircraft that took out enemy strongpoints using accurate
dive-bombing from overhead.
4. Deep Strikes. Germany’s military tactics were designed to achieve
a quick victory while avoiding actual battle as much as possible. Once their armored units had achieved a
breakthrough they used their speed and mobility to disrupt enemy communications
as well as suppress opposition efforts at resupply, reinforcement and any
organized counterstrike. The panzer
divisions were capable of reaching thirty miles within a day while follow-up
infantry units maneuvered to envelope and dismantle the opposing force. This rapidity of movement created confusion
among allied commanders in 1940. The
result was a paralysis of indecision. How
should they respond? Where should they
respond? Was the enemy’s objective the Channel
coast or was it Paris? It’s important to
military commanders to keep the enemy guessing so they cannot easily concentrate
their defenses.
Penetrating deep behind enemy lines is the phase of blitzkrieg with the greatest potential
for the enemy’s destruction. It is also
the point of the attacking army’s greatest vulnerability. To better appreciate the problems inherent in
blitzkrieg let’s first quickly look at the technological advances that occurred
following the First World War. Certainly
the most dramatic advances occurred in aircraft design and performance. The military planes of 1940 were much faster,
had greater range and payload and were considerably more rugged than the wood
and canvas biplanes of 1918. Tank
performance also far exceeded the first tentative efforts in tank design made
by the British near the close of World War I.
These first tanks proved of little value in actual battlefield
conditions. Their slow speed and
unreliability made them incapable of exploiting a breakthrough of enemy
lines.
Most everyone appreciates the contribution tanks and planes
made to blitzkrieg. But there is a third
contribution that proved fundamental to the success of ‘lightening warfare’ and
is often overlooked. Fast and mobile
armored units stretched the range of the battlefield many times beyond what it
had once been in more conventional conflicts.
Command and control of one’s own units wouldn’t have been possible under
these circumstances twenty years previously.
Improvements in radio changed this and enabled ‘real time’ communications
over vast areas. Radios were now more powerful
and more reliable in different terrains and under varied weather conditions. Most important, though, was the fact that radios
had become portable. They fit in tanks
and planes. Commanders could interact
with their units and coordinate their maneuvers. Planes could better collaborate with the ground
troops they were aiding. Commanders were
aware of their units’ status and disposition, enabling armored penetrations
that would have been reckless had they been moving blind.
The fact that armored spearheads were able to quickly cover
vast distances created another danger.
Their long, thin probes left their flanks vulnerable to an enemy
counterattack. While the German assault
into northern France in 1940 had available to it three mechanized infantry
divisions that were capable of keeping pace with the tanks, they were not
enough. The vast majority of Germany’s
infantry still moved on foot. At various
times the tanks had to wait for foot soldiers to make up the ground. Tanks were also limited logistically. Much of the German army’s supply was the
responsibility of horse-drawn wagons. Despite
these drawbacks the effect of blitzkrieg on the opposing force was both
dramatic and devastating.
5. Follow-up. A very small portion of the German army
actually decided the issue in the Battle of France in 1940. But once armor has achieved the battlefield advantage
there is still the need for large numbers of troops to secure the ground
recently won. Without the follow-up of a
mass army a tank assault is little more than a cavalry charge into vast
stretches of land. It’s an exhilarating
sight but ultimately on no consequence.
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