stalemate
At the Somme, Flanders, Verdun
the verdict of battles fought from 1914 to 1918
remained the same for France during
the Great War - defense decides the matter.
Military élan was quickly dispatched
with a ruthless industrial efficiency
found in the place called
no mans' land.
Maginot Line
280 miles in length.
Half a million men permanently stationed
in this subterranean fortress
beneath the rolling plains of France
frozen in place,
unavailable to act in response
to any scenario not already anticipated.
an elaborate castle that burrows deep
Living below ground is cold and damp
with frequent sewage backups
but all one's needs are provided here
and it feels safe.
Maurice Gamelin
General of the Army
The man in charge of France's defense
has his headquarters just outside Paris
a hundred miles from the front,
messages being passed back and forth
by motorcycle couriers as Gamelin forgoes
real-time radio communications with his troops.
What's the hurry?
Char B1 throws a tread
It's slow - not much faster than walking
because that's all a tank is meant to do -
be there to support the troops.
The tank commander must lead his men
from a tiny cramped turret while
at the same time load and fire the gun.
Those making decisions about tank design
really didn't give it sufficient thought.
Blitzkrieg
France was the homeowner trying
to protect what it had
Germany's role was that of intruder
trying to take something away.
Germany needed to focus
on strategies for aggression,
something that would gain their goals quickly
..before one's powerful enemies could react.
Open, flat terrain makes for perfect tank country,
countryside like that found in
Poland, Belgium and France.
All these armored vehicles require good roads
and available railway networks to meet
their continuous demands for fuel, men, machinery.
The Achille's Heel became apparent when your
leading generals are stranded on some
muddy Russian steppe with little to do
other than hold an empty can of petrol.
Dornier Do-17
It was decided early on that the Luftwaffe's role
was in support of the Army because
any war that Germany fought must be won
maneuvering on land.
Consequently, Germany's tactical bombers
were short-winded in payload and range
their practical limit was the nearby front
when what they might need was to
strangle distant supply chokepoints
that were currently out of reach.
Heinz Guderian
General
For the most part German generals
were like their French and British counterparts
blind to the promise of new technology
they couldn't bring their mind's eye
to see how dynamic the battlefield
had now become.
While on maneuvers in 1935 General Guderian
made believers of the top German Army brass
as he controlled his division's various elements
of tanks, infantry, artillery and others
all traveling at the same constant speed
as his rapid mobile command center.
What had been book-bound armor theory
was now operational army doctrine.
British troops strafed
and the democracies would find themselves
needing to do some quick catchup
their only victory so far being
their desperate retreat from Dunkirk
love
dad
© Tom Taylor
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