Saturday, February 8, 2025

First Blood

  







Saturday 13 Feb.  1:30 pm


American flyers respond to report of enemy trucks

driving north to south just east of Faid.

The pilots strafe and bomb an estimated 100 vehicles

loaded with troops.  As a result 20 trucks are claimed

to have been destroyed.







 13 Feb. Saturday - late afternoon.


German troops begin sporadic shelling of American

troops entrenched atop Djebel Lassouda - 

a hill that guards the road to Sbeitla.  A few

short miles away a second hilltop, Djebel Ksaira,

is similarly fortified with Yanks guarding the highway.







 13 Feb:  Saturday evening


General Eisenhower came to Tebessa to survey

General Fredendall's deployment of US troops.

The commander of II Corps didn't foresee any

major action on this front.  The 1st Armored Division

was scattered about the Sbeitla plain despite

Army doctrine calling for concentrating your armored

power.  There was dissention among Fredendall's

field commanders.  For one thing he was making 

decisions without knowing the circumstance.

Only once had he even visited the frontline and

his visit there was too brief to assess the terrain.


Eisenhower was not one to interfere.

He deferred tactical decisions to his subordinates.

His commanders were picked with the expectation

they were up to the job.  He left for Constantine 

keeping his beliefs to himself.


A warning from Allied intelligence was just received.

Axis forces would attack in the morning -

Valentine's day.  The question was where.

General Anderson, the front's commander, believed

the assault would be up around Tunis.

An attack into central Tunis would be a diversion.

Very manageable.








14 Feb. Sunday 4:00 am


German forces attack Sidi Bou Zid.


5:30 am.

Upon his arrival at Constantine Eisenhower receives

news of fierce fighting around the small Arab village.

General McQuillin of Combat Command A, CCA,

reports his men are holding their own.


He counterattacks with his tanks charging.








 14 Feb. Sunday - midafternoon


Setbacks reported.

Two American infantry battalions were surrounded,

marooned on two separate hilltops near Sidi Bou Zid.

Meanwhile to the south Combat Command A was

fighting for its survival.

The quick, bold charge of tanks was easily repulsed.

The long distance guns on the Tiger tanks easily picked

off all Yankee armor before they ever got close.


Now nothing stood in the way of advancing German armor.








 14 Feb Sunday evening


Germans controlled Sidi Bou Zid.

The Americans were in retreat to Sbeitla.

Their tank battalion destroyed.

Their artillery overrun.  They'd been routed.


The two infantry battalions surrounded on the hilltops

of Lassouda and Ksaira took advantage of darkness

and attempted to escape the German noose by

slipping through enemy lines in small groups of 2 or 3. 


It was an unfair fight.

Battalions of inexperienced GIs taking on

divisions of experienced Panzer troops.

And something else was wrong.

U.S. Army armored doctrine was obsolete.

Someone needed to shake it up.



*  *  *  *  *





©  Tom Taylor







OVER  EASY



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Sunday, February 2, 2025

good morning jacob








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love

   dad



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Saturday, February 1, 2025

Faid

  







 Axis troops were being crowded into the coastal

area extending from the Mediterranean port of Bizerte 

in the north to Gabes in the south.  The Allies wanted to

use the mountain pass at Faid to strike east, dividing

the German force by capturing Sfax.


Hitler's man in North Africa, General Arnim, responded 

by sending a division of German tanks to wrest

Faid from its poorly equipped French defenders. 

Armin determined that all mountain passes leading

to the Tunisian coast would be under his control.









The Eastern Dorsal mountain range rose to over

four thousand feet at its highest and provided 

safe-haven for North Africa's Axis troops.

It was an effective fortress with its passes armed

to the teeth.  But it was only a defense.


Rommel had a plan to win.

He wouldn't stop with taking Faid but

continue west, routing the Yanks at Kasserine.

Then on to Tebessa - capturing its vast stores

of Allied tanks, trucks, ammunition, fuel and all

the other supplies Rommel would need to stock 

his major offensive.


He would drive Allied forces back into Algeria,

all the way to the Mediterranean shore.

Frankly, Rommel knew his strategy was

a long shot.  That's what he did best.

The audacious gamble.


Arnim's defense was a half-measure leading only

to ultimate defeat.







 American tankers were far better trained than

the stateside GIs that were rushed across the 

Atlantic to land on North African beaches.

Tanks of the 1st Armored Division were dispersed 

on a large plain surrounding Sidi Bou Zid.

The French at Faid made desperate pleas for their 

help.  There was no time to spare.


The American II Corps commander had other ideas.

His response would have been piecemeal at best.

It wouldn't be enough to stop the 10th Panzer Division.


Not with those Yankee Doodle tanks.

The ones engineered by Dr. Seuss.








 The Germans proved to be their own worst enemy.

They were of two minds in countering Allied strategy.

Arnim was the realist.  The resources to fuel 

a German offensive against the Allies didn't exist.

Only high risk action will save the day according

to Rommel.


You have no choice.


But there would be no unified command.

Coordination and cooperation between 

the two rival generals was grudging at best.

 Jealousies helped defeat the German effort.








 The rifleman.


Chances are he doesn't know where he is or 

where he is going.  He knows what is needed

for him to be a rifleman.  That's it. 

The perfect POW.  He knows nothing, 


Maybe you find yourself sitting in the back of a truck

one bitter cold night.  You've been going nowhere

now for three straight hours.  What's happening?

No one knows.  Don't worry about it.

It's the Army.







 American officers spent too much time being uncertain.

Where's the enemy?  What's his disposition?  

Those are standard, healthy questions.

Who's in charge?  Whose orders do I obey?

This is where military chain of command breaks down.


The American response to the conflict at Faid 

revealed fractured leadership among the top brass

at II Corps.  General Fredendall distrusted the 

reports coming from his commanders in the field.

This led to bad decision-making on everyone's part.

Opportunities were missed.  Mistakes made.

Battles lost.


There was frustration and finger-pointing

among the generals going into Kasserine.



*  *  *  *  *




©  Tom Taylor






OVER   EASY 



coldValentine