12 May 1940 - Flanders

Panzers in Belgium, 1940

News of the deteriorating situation had gone from bad to alarming as report updates steadily flowed into the Belgian military command.  The officers involved with critical decision-making were clearly upset but they were still charged with saving the nation from disaster.  The linchpin of their initial defense, the 1200 man fortress Eben Emael, the modern man-made Gibraltar, had been rendered useless through the quick work of 78 German engineers and, ultimately, lost to the invaders within the space of 24 hours.  The entire Belgian defense along the Albert Canal had also crumbled and its demoralized formations were falling back towards the River Dyle and their last chance to stop the German troops from sweeping across their land and into France.

German forces were now less than 25 miles from the Belgium capital of Brussels and BEF Corps Commander Alan Brooke motored east from Louvain with 3^rd Division Commander Bernard Montgomery to survey the scene of battle.  The road was clogged with frightened refugees, bundled with precious few possessions, and streaming in the opposite direction, away from the violence that was engulfing their homes just a few miles further down the road.  General Brooke remarked how strange the scene was of refugees trudging pass a crowd of church-goers, congregated in their Sunday best and, seemingly, chatting as they would following any morning service.  War had intervened once again to flip all sense of reason upside down.

Army Group B Commander Fedor von Bock knew he wasn’t making any friends as he whipped his senior commanders into a greater sense of urgency.  16^th Panzer Corps Commander Erich Höepner snapped back angrily, “You don’t need to push me!”  Bock felt otherwise.  He relentlessly pushed the reeling Dutch and Belgian forces back into a hurried, improvisational retreat.  He wouldn't allow them time to accurately assess their situation or to determine an appropriate countermeasure.  With speed he could stampede the Belgians into the laps of the advance elements of British and French forces who were just now attempting to set up their own defensive positions along the River Dyle.  Maintaining the pressure wasn’t going to be easy.  Bock had still to contend with the many waterways crossing his line of attack.  There were simply too few bridges to move men, armor and supplies forward as rapidly as opportunities presented themselves.  The narrow bridges were clogged and resulted in tremendous congestion as his surge of armies funneled through them on their way west.  Once again Bock found himself resorting to transporting fuel by air in an effort to keep his thirsty tanks moving.  Bock was passionate with impatience and he wanted those under him to share his killer instinct for attack.  They must believe as he did that Germany’s success in the West demanded that Allied commanders’ full attention be placed upon what was bearing down on them now.  They should consider no threat other than what he provided.

 French cavalry units used to reconnoiter areas of the Ardennes beyond the River Meuse were easily routed by massed German armor on this Sunday, 12 May.  Their alarm at what they saw had somehow failed to make it up the chain of command.  Still, there was concern enough for the French 2^nd Army to destroy the bridges in the Sedan sector of the Meuse River, and to secure the promise of four first-rate divisions to soon come to their aid.  For the moment they had only the French 10^th Corps, many of whom were aging reservists parked in an area considered to be of least importance.  The local French commanders now knew a German attack was coming but they had no appreciation of its speed or force.

About forty miles up the River Meuse, north of Sedan, Erwin Rommel’s 7^th Panzer Division had chased two retreating French Cavalry Divisions across the river.  Rommel’s attempt that afternoon to make a tank crossing of the river was thwarted as the French blew up all the bridges in the area.  He settled for planning an infantry assault across the river, scheduled for early the following morning.  Meanwhile, by that evening, two panzer divisions of Heinz Guderian’s 19^th Panzer Corps arrived on the north bank of the Meuse River, opposite the historic city of Sedan. 

Guderian was eager to begin the effort to cross the Meuse the following day but it wasn’t certain he would get the needed approval from his immediate superior, Ewald Kleist.  Guderian’s tanks would be making their assault without proper infantry support.  Waiting for their arrival would require a delay of, at least, another day.  But Kleist, a usually more cautious commander than Guderian, had been pleased with the Panzer Group’s progress through the Ardennes and agreed to the next day’s attack.  Preparations for the assault were made during the night.  It was decided the Corps’ artillery resources would be concentrated on the main focus of attack – the area opposite 1^st Panzer Division.  One other critical component for success was arranged for – the inclusion of twelve squadrons of dive-bombers to be used to help force the river crossing.  The following day would give the Allied command their first inkling that the battle they would fight wasn’t the one for which they had planned.

Related Topics:

10 May 1940 - Flanders

11 May 1940 - Flanders

Blitzkrieg

Objective:  France 1940

11 May, 1940 - Flanders

Battle of Flanders

German anti-tank crew in Belgium, 1940

By the second day of battle the German army was proceeding mostly to plan while confusion was already beginning to set in with the Allied forces.  Two reasons can quickly be identified as the root cause of Allied disorganization.  The more significant is probably the lack of coordination between Allied command and the command of Belgian and Dutch forces, which acted independent of any overall command structure.  This contributed to the friction over where troops would be assigned along the River Dyle defensive line.  A second significant problem was the inability of different commands to communicate with one another, making it nearly impossible for battlefield commanders to address problems between units and also obscuring the changing nature of the battle itself.  Contributing to the inability to communicate was the policy of French High Command to maintain mostly radio silence during the period leading up to the outbreak of war on May 10.  Radio operators had little, if any, actual experience on their equipment.  The result was that orders and messages between commands often depended upon overburdened and insecure commercial phone lines.  When Bernard Montgomery, commander of the British 3^rd Division, reported a dispute between his unit and a Belgian division over who had responsibility for a sector on the defensive line, his commanding officer, General Alan Brooke found it exceedingly difficult to reach his own headquarters in an attempt to resolve the matter.

Still the Germans were not without problems.  One of the arguments against relying on a major offensive to sweep through the Low Countries was the numerous waterways that slowed movement and provided natural defensive barriers to oncoming troops.  General Fedor von Bock, Commander of Germany’s Army Group B, was particularly frustrated with the snarled traffic approaching a critical bridge that crossed the Maas River into Holland.  His valuable 9^th Panzer Division was stalled and vulnerable to air attack.  Fortunately for his men no Allied aircraft ever appeared.  His 4^th Panzer Division was nearly without fuel because of the difficulties in delivering supplies across the Maas and Albert Canal.  In desperation he was able to fly in 20,000 liters of fuel but that amount wouldn't take a thirsty armored division very far down the road.

Better progress was being made further south as the 3^rd Panzer Division had crossed the bridge at Maastricht and was now pushing into Belgium.  German divisions were beginning to cross the Albert Canal in number, forcing Belgian troops into a general retreat towards the next available defensive line along the River Dyle.  They would show up just as French and British troops were arriving to set up their own defensive positions.  At one point Belgians fired on Montgomery’s 3^rd division, believing them to be German paratroopers.  The success of the German onslaught reinforced French conviction that they were facing the full weight of the German offensive in this Battle of Flanders.

Meanwhile, Army Group A was making steady progress through the Ardennes countryside to the southeast.  Heinz Guderian’s lead tank divisions, the 1^st, 2^nd and 10^th Panzer Division had all fought off token resistance from both Belgian troops and French cavalry.  By the evening of this second day, the 1^st Panzer Division was held up by stiffening French resistance just outside the town of Bouillon, a mere 10 miles from Sedan and their first critical objective – the River Meuse.  The success of Germany’s war in the West depended on the ability of their tanks to cross this river and break through French defenses on the far side.  If they succeeded in making it across their efforts and sacrifice would be rewarded with terrain perfectly suited for tank operations.  It would be open fields behind the enemy’s lines all the way to the English Channel, or Paris, or behind the Maginot Line – wherever the German command most desired to go.

Related Topics:

10 May 1940 - Flanders

12 May 1940 - Flanders

Blitzkrieg

Objective:  France 1940

10 May 1940 - Flanders

Battle of France

Glider used at Eben Emael

The morning came to life with reports from everywhere flooding in all at once.  Allied airfields were being bombed and strafed.  The frontier defenses of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France erupted with attacks all along the border with Germany.  The long winter lull, filled with months of boredom and tedious exercises, had become suddenly a swirl of actions, each demanding someone’s quick judgment call.  Each decision resulted in either a reward or penalty of great military consequence.  Mistakes would be made but there’s no time to fret.  So be it.  Keep moving.  Do the best you can.

10 May 1940 – Luftwaffe aircraft pounce on every Allied airfield within reach, destroying whatever planes are caught on the ground.  It is the required first step if German planes are to gain air superiority, enabling unrestricted action by Stuka Ju 87s to bomb and destroy enemy positions hindering the forward progress of fast moving Panzer units.  This is the combined one-two punch of Blitzkrieg air-ground attack.  It is the coordination of powerful tactical aircraft aiding the lethal drive of massed tank formations.

Immediately following the waves of fighters and bombers are formations of Junkers Ju-52s carrying airborne troops towards bridges crossing the Albert Canal, bridges that must be captured intact if German troops are to quickly penetrate Dutch and Belgian defenses.  This invasion has an unforgiving timetable that must be met if Germany is to achieve its ambitious goals.  Waterways must be broached.  Dutch and Belgian resistance must be quickly overwhelmed.  Germany’s long-time military rival, France, must suffer complete defeat.

In the air the British were slow to respond.  It wasn’t until 1100 hours that RAF bombers were ordered to attack German units west of the Rhine.  As it turns out these attacks were largely ineffective.  Within the first three days of fighting the British lost half of their 200 bombers stationed in France.  The French air force was virtually wiped out.  German aircraft were newer and superior in performance than most Allied aircraft.  Also, the German command structure enabled them to concentrate their airpower while Allied efforts were more dispersed.  Still, the battle in the air wasn’t all one-sided.  German losses were 83 aircraft on 10 May alone, including 47 bombers.  One problem was that neither side appreciated how vulnerable unescorted bombers would be to fighter attack.  German losses to their fleet of transport aircraft were also high with 213 Luftwaffe transports lost and another 240 damaged.  This represented 80 percent of the transport fleet.

The French and British have positioned their best, most mobile, armies along France’s border with southern Belgium.  They’ve long anticipated a German sweep through the Low Countries in order to plunge into northern France, much as the Hun did 25 years before in 1914.  The building of the impregnable Maginot Line along the border shared by France and Germany all but makes this course the only feasible avenue for invasion, or so thought the French High Command.

German paratroopers landed near key bridges in the early morning hours of 10 May and were able to capture nearly all of them before defenders were able to blow the bridges up.  Rotterdam, the hub of Dutch communications was attacked with its airfield and bridges across the River Maas captured.  Paratroopers also captured the airfields near the Dutch capital of The Hague but were driven off by Dutch counterattacks.  Nonetheless these troop attacks from the air added greatly to Allied confusion.

The key defense of the Albert Canal was Belgium’s reputably impregnable fortress, Eben Emael.  Glider-borne German troops landed on the fort’s roof, taking advantage of its Achilles’ heel, a very limited defense against attack from the air.  A contingent of less than a hundred German engineers effectively disabled the fortification, manned by over 1,200 men.  Within 24 hours Eben Emael was lost despite a desperate counterattack from Belgium troops.  Allied commanders expected the fort to hold for a good five days.  They hoped Belgian defenders along the Albert Canal would give them the time needed for French and British troops to reach the River Dyle and set up a coordinated defense with the Belgians.

Plan ‘D’, the Allied strategy to rush troops to a defensive line along Belgium’s River Dyle had two major problems.  Belgian fear of a hostile German response meant it never agreed to properly coordinate their defense with French and British troops.  Consequently, during the heat of battle, there was much confusion and disorganization between French, British and Belgian military contingents.  The second, more lethal, problem would not reveal itself before another four days.  Germany’s plan all along was to lure the best of British and French forces into a fatal trap.  The sweep by Germany’s Army Group B into and through the defenses of the Netherlands and Belgium was actually a distraction.  The early successes of these troops in Holland and along the Albert Canal convinced the French command that they were right in moving the weight of their army deep into Belgium territory.  Their attention was fixed on the desperate battle now unfolding to the north and west.  They had no inkling whatsoever of the enormous offensive force of concentrated tanks to the southeast that was steadily moving towards a lightly defended French portion of the Meuse River opposite the Ardennes forest.  None in the French high command could conceive of a large tank attack coming out of this densely forested, hilly terrain.  This is exactly what German military planners had counted on the Allies to believe.  If this were a game of chess this would now become the equivalent of checkmate in five moves or less.

Related Topics:

11 May 1940 - Flanders

12 May 1940 - Flanders

Blitzkrieg

Objective:  France 1940